This paper shows an empirical relationship between trade, openness and domestic con°ict for Latin America based on the analytical framework of Gar¯nkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2004).
Introduction
Analyzing con°icts over resources and output is an interesting topic of economic research. The World Bank project on the Economics of Civil War, Crime and Violence is one of the many examples of ongoing research e®orts 1 that analyze occurrences and duration of con°icts in an attempt to devise credible mitigation mechanisms. One of the important results of these studies is the fact that increased trade openness may have some mitigating e®ects on con°ict (see Hegre (2002) for example). However, some studies, like Collier and Hoe²er (2004) , also point that over-reliance on primary commodity exports, which may be a fallout of increased trade openness, leads to more con°icts. This e®ect is especially pronounced for Africa. This argument indicates the problem of \natural resource curse". It is also established that underlying socio-political and institutional structures play signi¯cant roles for starting and sustaining con°icts (see Collier and Hoe²er (1998) its control. Consequently, if opening to trade lowers the price of the contested resource relative to the no-trade situation, domestic con°ict declines. In contrast, if openness raises its price above the level of the price in a no-trade scenario, con°ict increases. 3 Gar¯nkel et al. (2004) point out that in the latter case, internal con°ict may increase such that it o®sets the usual static gains from trade.
Interesting though their theory is, it is motivated and supported by anecdotal evidence. This paper, using the analytical approach of Gar¯nkel et al. (2004) , undertakes a careful empirical analysis for a panel of Latin American countries. We address two important, but fundamentally distinct questions. First, how do changes in trade openness a®ect the likelihood to initiate the con°ict? Second, once initiated, how do variations in openness a®ect the duration of con°ict?
Although Gar¯nkel et al.'s (2004) analysis is static and does not address the second question directly, it is a natural corollary of their argument. If trade openness serves to increase the incentives and opportunity to engage in con°ict, it is likely also to a®ect the participant's incentives and ability to sustain con°ict. We take this point to investigate the con°ict duration issue simultaneously with the onset issue, which is a major but plausible departure from the existing literature. Latin America as averaging out may lead to loss of observations and degrees of freedom. 4 The time frame re°ects trade openness aspects for a long period of time capturing both no interaction with the rest of world in the seventies as well as more participation in the world trade in the later eighties and nineties.
In section 2, we discuss Gar¯nkel et al. (2004) in more detail, highlighting their channels, explicitly or by extension, about con°ict initiation and duration. The argument is that the primary goods sector (for example, agriculture in Latin America) is where one is (i) most likely to see a con°ict for control of resources, (ii) that the relative prices of these goods are likely to change as a 3 We provide the underlying intuition of this result in the next section when we discuss the Gar¯nkel et al. (2004) framework in greater detail. 4 See Fearon (2005) for more discussion on the usage of annual data in place of¯ve-year average observations. result of trade liberalization (which can be indirectly captured through changes in the level of goods being exported or imported) and (iii) depending on the relative price change, we would therefore expect to see openness either stimulating and sustaining con°icts or abetting con°icts. In section 3, we brie°y summarize the existing empirical literature and identify the explanatory factors that help us check for the validity of trade and openness argument in the Latin American context. Sections 4 and 5, based on the previous section's discussion, explains data and methodologies used in the present study, respectively. All results are reported in section 6. There is a sizeable literature on con°icts that has identi¯ed many possible factors a®ecting con°ict occurrence (and, to a lesser extent, duration). Using this literature to identify additional covariates, we reestimate the models using ordinal regressions, markov switching techniques and hazard regressions. The earlier results remain quite robust to the addition of these covariates. In their model, p oil denotes the relative price of \oil", a resource over which there is domestic con°ict. Once the gains and costs of con°icts are sorted out, then the parties resort to trading of the resources they control. Based on their framework, take the case where the con°ict is over land. To be speci¯c, parties in con°ict want to control \land" that provides them with opportunities to produce agricultural goods or extract natural resources that they can trade in the world market and generate income.
This con°ict over a resource has been played out time and again in Latin America, where land distribution is skewed. 5 When countries open up and start trading agricultural goods that use land as an input, the prices of these goods go up as compared to their autarkic price. Consequently, stakes from con°icts over land are now higher as that generates more returns once parties control and use that resource for future production of agricultural goods, which induces more con°icts afterwards.
From the empirical analysis point of view, the over-reliance of agricultural exports perfectly¯ts into this case, as we¯nd this over-dependence leads to low intensity con°ict sustenance overtime.
Agricultural exports as a part of total exports remains signi¯cant and positive for all the four models where this is used as a covariate, depicting a positive correlation with domestic con°ict. Bardhan (1970) and Dodzin and Vamvakidis (2004) o®er a related perspective on the lesser return and slow growth of some sectors in an economy that formed the basis of earlier trade protection and infant industry argument in developing countries.
As Latin American countries relied on trade protection in the seventies and eighties before opening up, the income earning opportunities in those countries may be severely limited, which also provided the background for domestic con°ict. Therefore, more trade openness leading to lowering con°ict intensity can be a plausible hypothesis to be explored in the present study.
(i) above which can be con¯rmed ex post based on the empirical¯ndings. opportunity has an indirect e®ect on the economy as it promotes human capital accumulation in the long run, which increases labor force productivity. The idea is that as workforce accumulates skills to do regular productive economic jobs, the opportunity cost of joining something unproductive rises manifold. Therefore, better educated workforce may have lesser inclination to accept rebels' jobs. As a result, secondary school enrollment is used as a proxy to higher income earning opportunity. In accordance to the above mentioned arguments, we also use growth rate of per capita GDP (Gpcg) 8 and secondary school-level education attainment (Ssi) to re°ect the dynamics of increased income earning opportunities and¯nd that both of these variables perform well in terms of explaining con°ict initiation and sustenance processes.
Investigations into international and domestic con°icts also look at institutional factors related to political and democratic structures of countries. The idea is that democratic countries 8 We are aware that there may be a possible endogeneity problem here in the sense that con°ict itself a®ects per capita GDP growth. But as our dependent variable re°ects how many deaths occurred due to the con°ict between government forces and the rebels over time, we think that the death count does not directly a®ect the GDP growth rate. It at best re°ects the overall scenario regarding the security situation of any country.
actively support political rights and participation in political process by all fractions of society reduces domestic con°ict risk. Reynal-Querol's (2002) arguements for example, is supportive of this \political center" idea that points to lack of democracy and absence of political mechanism to achieve peaceful con°ict resolution. 9 Rodrik (2000) argues that democratic institutions provide ways of regulating and managing social con°icts through participatory means and rules of law, and hence dissipate the adverse consequences of external shocks. Skaperdas (1992) and Gar¯nkel (1994) provides and Wantchekon (2000). 11 . Keeping all these issues in mind, we take \political rights", (P lrg), as one of the explanatory variables to check for the robustness of trade and openness variables. We believe that it is a much better proxy than the measure of democracy, as better political rights are always associated with proper democracies. 11 These studies, using cross-sectional statistical data show that the correlation between democracy and mineral resource dependence is negative. 12 We have checked for robustness by dropping political rights and using democracy index of Marshall and Jaggers (2002). The results do not appear to provide extra information and so we report results including P lrg as one of the explanatory variables.
Looking at the duration of civil war, Collier et al. (2001) , using hazard models, argue that duration can be attributed to some non-economic factors, like, ethnic diversity, forest cover and development of unpoliced international arms market in the eighties. Therefore, according to them, the issue of primary commodity dependence can be judged more as an issue for con°ict initiation than sustenance over time. The emergence of illegal arms markets tries to¯nd an answer into a large perspective of¯nancing of armed con°icts as pointed out by Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001, 2002) . On the other hand, in our analysis, we use trade and openness variables (which can be treated as a part of primary commodities export) to understand how these factors can a®ect overall con°ict. Our results point to some important facts regarding con°ict survival, when we use these variables, which provides another insight into the domestic con°ict survival process in Latin America.
Deviating from reasons of con°ict based on socio-political and economic motives, some studies use complex nonlinear alternative models. These works rely on statistical properties of the data rather than underlying socio-political or economic intuitions that can explain domestic con°ict. signi¯cantly increases the probability of internal con°ict. To better explain the factors that initiate con°icts from a previous no con°ict situation or from a low-intensity con°ict situation to high intensity con°ict scenario in presence of trade openness, we rely on pure statistical properties of the data sample. The basic idea to employ a new methodology comes from the fact that even if we try to control all the possible factors that can generate a background for con°ict initiation, it becomes virtually impossible to build a comprehensive framework taking care of all the possible factors. That calls for special treatments in the existing data sample so that the explanatory power of the possible factors and especially trade and openness factors can be improved from a purely statistical or methodological viewpoint. Therefore, we use markov switching analysis as employed in a recent analysis by Blomberg and Hess (2002) . However, our analysis is di®erent from theirs in that unlike them we control and condition a large number of economic and socio-political covariates in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, throughout our analysis, we categorize all the covariates or variables in two di®erent segments as above and below average to understand the underlying data pattern more e®ectively.
Description of the Data
In the present study, the dependent variable is \domestic con°ict" for seventeen Latin American countries from 1973 to 1995. 13 For this variable, we collected data from the \Armed Con°ict Data for all of these variables are collected from various issues of the Statistical Abstracts of Latin America.
GDP growth per capita (Gdpg), Rural population as a percentage of total population (Rpotp), rural population annual growth rate (Rpog) are included as explanatory variables in our analysis.
Data for these three are downloaded from the World Development Indicator web site of the World
Bank. In our study, we also include the infant mortality rate (Imr) data for the following purpose.
Higher infant mortality rates indirectly implicate the e®ectiveness of health infrastructure in a country. This might indirectly capture the level of governance. 14 Data on Imr are collected from the US Census Bureau's International Programs Center web site. 15 . Data on Ssi are taken from the Barro-Lee dataset and it denotes secondary school attainment.
To further corroborate the implication of openness variables, we use another index, sociopolitical index (Spi). This essentially captures the underlying grievance motive, if any, present in this region, which can further a®ect the con°ict situation. Trade variables re°ect the amount of trade between countries as well as with the rest of the world. To produce the tradable goods, a conducive business friendly environment is necessary. In that sense, underlying socio-political situation, which helps in policy formulations play very important role for proper economic functioning of an economy. We use principal components method to calculate this index with weights on the following socio-political variables: cabinet changes (Cabc), constitutional changes (Conc), assassinations (Assi), guerrilla activities (Guer), revolutions (Revo), strikes (Str), government crises 14 There are some other studies, like The State Failure Task Force reports use IMR also as an independent variable to explain con°ict. 15 The web site address is:-http://www.census.gov/ipc/www.
(Gov), coups (Coup), party fractionalization (P art), purges (P ur), and riots (Riots). 16 
Empirical Methodology
We use two di®erent classes of models for inference on the factors that a®ect the intensity of con°ict, ordinal regression models and markov switching models. So far, in the literature, researchers do not employ the panel ordinal regression technique, mainly because of the fact that the dependent variable was not categorized like what we have. 18 Therefore, this paper applies a new technique to understand the con°ict dynamics as we apply a hitherto unexploited methodological approach.
For investigating factors a®ecting duration of con°ict in the Latin American region, we use the 16 We can think of these variables as potential breeding ground of a predator (a la Grossman and Kim (1995)) because presence of these activities signal weak state mechanism. Incidentally, the State Failure Task Force take \revolutionary wars" and \adverse or disruptive regime transitions" as di®erent events to identify state failures. 17 The web site is:-http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidglobal/economic.htm.
standard cox proportional model with time-varying covariates. In the following subsections, we provide a brief summary of these models and a rationale as to why these are suitable and useful in our context.
Review of Ordinal Regression
The nature of the dependent variable of interest is ordinal, as levels of con°ict intensities are based on the number of deaths occuring. Therefore, more deaths imply a higher level of con°ict intensity and a natural order on the values of the dependent variable. 
where c ¤ represents the unobservable, \true", level of intensity of con°ict that varies freely and is connected with the observed intensity categories as follows:
The ¹'s are unknown threshold parameters to be jointly estimated with the structural parameter vector¯. We assume that ² is normally distributed across observations with mean 0 and variance 1. The corresponding probabilities, i.e. the probabilities for each observed intensity level, are then 19 To avoid cluttering the notation we ommit the sample indexes in what follows.
given by:
The following constraint in the threshold parameters is also required in order to ensure that all the probabilities are positive:
Beck, King and Zeng (2000) show that standard logit estimation tends to underestimate the rare events probability and therefore needs suitable corrections; we apply their recommended corrections 
Markov Switching Analysis
The Markov switching speci¯cation has a dual use in our analysis. First, this speci¯cation can aid us in measuring the extent that the particular intensity of con°ict in period t, either high or low, a®ects the probability that the country will be in a particular state, of either high con°ict or low con°ict, in period (t + 1). Therefore, using this technique, we address the question of the persistence of past con°ict intensity on current con°ict intensity, as identi¯ed and debated in the existing empirical literature. The second use of a Markov switching speci¯cation is in analyzing how existing con°icts interact with other economic and socio-political variables to determine the future probability of initiating con°icts. In that case, the basic objective is to identify factors that determine transition from one state of con°ict at time period t to either remain in that state at time period (t + 1) or to revert to another state at time period (t + 1). For the present analysis, we assume that any country is experiencing one of the two states at all times, namely, \domestic con°ict" or \peace". 20 Domestic con°ict at time period t is determined as the occurences of con°ict (i.e., it is taking the value 1) in time period t. Therefore, no domestic con°ict in period (t + 1) is determined by a value of 0 (i.e., no con°ict occurence) in period (t + 1). Since, both cannot occur together at the same period, these events are mutually exclusive from a statistical viewpoint. We denote con°ict in period t by C t and no con°ict in period t by N t . Taking a¯rst-order Markov process, initially we look for the past periods in°uence on current periods con°ict process.
Let Á ij be the conditional probability that the country is in state i = C; N in period t and in state j = C; N in period (t + 1). The (2 £ 2) transition probability matrix between the economy's state in period t and (t + 1) is therefore: 2 4 P r(C t+1 jC t ) P r(N t+1 jC t ) P r(C t+1 jN t ) P r(N t+1 jN t )
where, P r denotes probability and each row of the above transition matrix sums to 1. Therefore, this (2£2) Markov transition matrix only requires us to estimate two parameters as Á CN = 1¡Á CC and Á NN = 1 ¡ Á NC . Let, n ij be the number of occurrences of state i in period t and in state j in period (t + 1), and let n i be the number of occurrences of state i in period (t + 1), so that for the (2 £ 2) Markov matrix, n CC + n CN = n C and n NC + n NN = n N . The log-likelihood function, ln(L) for the (2 £ 2) Markov process can be written as follows:
and the corresponding maximum likelihood estimators of the probabilities are d
, that is the corresponding sample proportions on the number of transitions.
20 Though the sample data are categorized into four di®erent intensities, we replace the higher intensity categories with only one category to indicate that there is con°ict. we again estimate a (2 £ 2) transition matrix of probabilities, where elements, Á ij for i; j = 1; 2 specify the transitions from state i in period t to state j in period (t + 1). The Markov transition matrix and the maximum likelihood estimates for the (2 £ 2) matrix follow the probability matrix presented above.
In the appendix tables, we report the estimated Á CC , Á NC and Á NN coming both from models involving only trade and openness variables as well as models incorporating other socio-political and economic variables in addition to the openness and trade variables.
Cox Proportional Hazard Model
Unlike the above mentioned ordinal regression and markov switching models, which look at the factors responsible for domestic con°ict initiation and changes in its intensity, the Cox proportional hazard model addresses \duration" or \survival" ability of con°icts based on certain explanatory variables or covariates. Here, we take the number of years as the time that the con°ict process itself will survive. As far as the \status variable" goes, we take P lrg, that is the political rights variable as the benchmark point, with the value of 1 denoting the highest level of political rights and democracy, and that signi¯es stability of the system. Denoting \spell length", i.e., di®erent duration variables for measurement as T , we can interpret that the probability that the spell of length of con°ict will be at least \t" as \survival function", with the form:
where,
The \hazard rate" then becomes the rate at which con°ict spells are completed after duration t, given that they last at least until t. The \hazard function" therefore tries to answer the query that given the con°ict spell has lasted until time t, what is the probability that it will end in the next short interval of time. This looks like:
After making these adjustments, we have estimated ten di®erent models with only trade and openness variables and ten other models with other covariates being added into the original ten models for con°ict survival process. For estimation purposes, we use Cox's (1972) partial likelihood estimation method. 21 The model speci¯es that:
where, the function¸0 is the \baseline" hazard, which needs to be estimated. As we employ cox's partial likelihood estimator, therefore, we need to estimate only¯, and not¸0. Note that this estimator removes individual covariate speci¯c heterogeneity in the sample. This works in the following way. Suppose that the sample contains K distinct exit times from con°ict, T 1 ; ::::; T K .
For any time T i , the risk set 22 denoted R i , is all countries whose exit time is at least T i . The risk 21 A later version of that technique is also used by Raknerud and Hegre (1997) and Collier, Hoe²er and Soderbom (2001) addressing the con°ict survival question. 22 For our purpose, it means, those countries still \at risk" of con°ict at time T k .
set is de¯ned with respect to any moment in time T as the set of countries who have not yet exited from con°ict prior to that time. For every country j in risk set R i , t j¸Ti . The probability that a country exits at time T i given that exactly one country exits at this time is:
In appendix tables, we report parameter values of this estimated¯. Note that, now negativē denotes a situation where the hazard of con°ict is going to increase and positive¯represents a scenario that dampens the con°ict survival probability. We also look at the level of signi¯cance and the odds ratios from individual covariates to conclude about the survival probability of domestic con°ict. Odds ratios hovering around one signi¯es more risk of the event happening as a result of the explanatory factor.
Empirical Results and Discussions

Results from Panel of Countries: Initiation and Sustenance Issues of Trade and Openness Variables
We report two sets of results in the¯rst appendix, one with all control variables (reported with AllCntrl: in the table heading), and another with only e®ective controls (denoted by Ef f:Cntrl:),
i.e., Lual and Landlock. The choice of e®ective control is determined by the level of signi¯cance for these variables. Tables 1, 2 , 6 and 7 in the¯rst appendix report estimation results from proportional ratio (i.e., the ordinal model, denoted by OM in the rest of the paper), response category probabilities from the ordinal models, and proportional hazard models (denoted by CM in the rest of the paper) involving all the controls, respectively. Tables 3, 4 and 8 report the same results involving e®ective controls. Table 5 reports results from markov switching models (denoted by MS for the rest of the paper). 23 The last three rows in tables 1 and 3 contain the number of 23 Markov switching analysis is carried out for those countries where there is both con°ict and no-con°ict within the time frame. As a result, some countries are not included as they do not show any con°ict within the sample period. We have done this check separately from these truncated sample without imposing any controls, the results of which are available upon request. goods production. That in°uences prices of these tradables as compared to the autarkic price of these goods when there was no trade. As prices of these tradables increase, returns from resources used to produce these goods also go up. Consequently, grabbing these resources become bene¯cial for the parties engaged in production of those tradable goods. This process will lead to a start of con°ict or can transfer one existing con°ict from a low intensity to high intensity one. Notes for Table 2: 1. c's denote di®erent categories of con°icts.
Results from
2. RightP red: reports the correct in sample predictions in di®erent categories of con°icts in percentage terms. Notes for Table 4: 1. c's denote di®erent categories of con°icts.
2. RightP red: reports the correct in sample predictions in di®erent categories of con°icts in percentage terms. Notes for Table 5: 1. Á CC denotes con°ict in period \t+1" if there was con°ict in period \t".
2. Á NC denotes con°ict in period \t+1" if there was no con°ict in period \t".
3. Á NN denotes no con°ict in period \t+1" if there was no con°ict in period \t". Notes for Table 6: 1. Bold font denotes 1 percent, ** denotes 5 percent and * denotes 10 percent level of signi¯cance.
OR represents Odds
Ratio from di®erent models.
3. Obs: denotes number of valid observations in each model estimation. Notes for Table 7: 1. P lrg is the status variable in all of the above model estimation procedures.
Ratio from di®erent models. Notes for Table 8: 1. Bold font denotes 1 percent, ** denotes 5 percent and * denotes 10 percent level of signi¯cance.
3. Obs: denotes number of valid observations in each model estimation.
¡2LL denotes -2Log
Likelihood values of¯nal models with intercepts.
5. P lrg is the status variable in the above model estimation procedure. Notes for Table 12: 1. c's denote di®erent categories of con°icts.
2. RightP red: reports the correct in sample predictions in di®erent categories of con°icts in percentage terms. Notes for Table 13: 1. Same as Table 3 above. Notes for Table 17: 1. P lrg is the status variable in all of the above model estimation procedures.
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